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Abstract
The paper examines stock market behaviour on days preceding
and succeeding the announcement of a change in the monetary policy
stance. Market’s plausible reactions are tested using nonparametric
statistics. The tests reveals that there is no systematic pattern in its
reaction, neither towards the type of policy stance (expansionary or
contractionary), nor during the days corresponding to the ‘event’.
A ﬁnancial market will be declared information eﬃcient depending on the
speed with which it incorporates information correctly in its prices. There are
three qualifying words here. First, information: correct, relvant information
as against noise and fad. Second, speed: the information should get incor-
porated immediately. Third, price: the information not only gets discounted
in the prices, but valuation should be at the ‘correct’ price. Then generat-
ing excess returns from trends and patterns, or from any other publicised
information is near impossibility. For arbitraguers are not in the market for
nothing. And we have one too many of them in the market. This is the basis
of eﬃcient markets hypothesis (EMH) and this provides us with an elegant
framework for testing a market’s eﬃciency.
This paper examines the issue of semi-strong eﬃciency of the Indian stock
market, with respect to monetary policy announcement.
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1 Monetary Policy and Equity Markets
Monetary policy is a major lever through which the short-term macro ﬁne-
tuning is made possible. It inﬂuences stock market in three ways. First, it
directly eﬀects trading in securities by aﬀecting liquidity available for specu-
lative activities. Second, it inﬂuence the expectations in the market through
policy signalling. Third, it aﬀects the present value of the future ﬂow of
earnings, and the earning ﬂow itself, and hence inﬂuence equity prices. This
can happen though the various channels of the monetary transmission mech-
anism (MTM), such as the credit market channel, interest channel or even
the stock market channel – the latter, probably being an area which is rel-
atively under-explored. But, the direct impact of a monetary policy stance
on the equity markets can sometimes be hazy, because at times the policy
itself could be a reaction to the market and become endogenous.
With regard to MTM channels Bernanke (2003) shows that the eﬀect
of monetary policy on the markets through real interest rate is very little.
Instead, the reaction is driven by aﬀecting the expected future excess re-
turns and to some extent by expected future dividends. When it comes to
the credit market channel, a contractionary policy aﬀects those ﬁrms who
are highly bank dependent borrowers, as banks reduce their overall supply
of credit (Kashyap et al., 1993). This is on two accounts: First, with ris-
ing interest rates the present value of collaterals will fall adversely aﬀecting
their balance sheets. Second, though information asymmetries prevail in the
market, at times, divulging information pays. For instance, during times of
credit squeeze banks tend to limit their credit lines. In such periods, ﬁrms
with less publicly available information may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to access bank
loans (Gertler, 1994).
So a major conditioning factor here is the ﬁrm–speciﬁc attributes. That
is, monetary policy aﬀect each ﬁrm diﬀerently depending on their ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc and industry speciﬁc characteristics, and therefore the equity prices will
react accordingly. Thorbecke (1997) shows that response of stock returns to
monetary policy is larger for small ﬁrms. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004)
shows that the eﬀect on ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms is much larger — the
impact on ﬁrms with low cash ﬂows and low debt to capital ratio is twice
as much as those with high cash ﬂow and debt. Similarly, sectors which are
cyclical and capital intensive react two to three times more than non-cyclical
industries. He also shows that monetary policy works its way into equity
markets through “shocks”. For S&P 500 an unexpected tightening of 50
basis points can decrease the return by 3% on the day of the announcement.
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2 Event Studies
The semi–strong form eﬃciency states that investors cannot make excess
returns using any publicly available information. Since, the moment the
information becomes public it gets immediately incorporated in the prices.
This makes an investor unable to gain by using this information to predict
the returns. After Fama (1991) such studies are increasingly called as event
studies.
The usual purpose for which an event study is employed in the ﬁnance
literature is to measure the eﬀect of an event of interest on the value of the
ﬁrm. Given the neoclassical assumptions about the market, one expects the
market prices to react correctly and immediately to the event.
One of the ﬁrst studies in this regard was by Dolley (1933), who examined
the price eﬀects of stock splits. But, the methodology of event study as we
see today saw its beginnings, more or less, in Fama et al. (1969).
Some of the major event studies relating monetary policy and equity
markets are by Thorbecke (1997), Bomﬁm (2001), Lobo (2000), Kuttner
(2001) etc.
Thorbecke (1997) examined the reaction of the markets on days when
changes to Federal fund rates are announced for the period 1987 to 94. He
ﬁnds the US equity index reacts signiﬁcantly to policy announcements. Lobo
(2000) showed that in the US market for the period 1990-1998, the impact
of a monetary tightening was much stronger than monetary easing. Bom-
ﬁm (2001) ﬁnds that volatility is lower on days before the monetary policy
announcement and increases substantially after the decision is made. Kut-
tner (2001) saw that during a policy announcement markets are reacting to
the unexpected component in the policy, which has yet not been discounted.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) also analysed the market by separating out
the surprise component. He measures surprise as the diﬀerence between the
announcement of the Fed, particularly FOMC(Federal Open Market Com-
mittee) decision and the market expectation. The data from Reuters Poll - a
survey conducted among market participants on Fridays before each FOMC
meeting - was used here to arrive at the market expectation.
Agrawal (2007) recently examined the impact of announcements by the
Reserve Bank of India on the Indian market. He examines 6 announcements
aﬀecting CRR between April 2006 and July 2007, classiﬁed as ‘good news’
and ‘bad news’. A hike in CRR is considered as a bad news, and a good news
is when, contrary to popular belief to control inﬂation, RBI leaves CRR un-
changed. The study takes an event window of 31 days — 15 days before the
event and 15 days after it. The data used is the cross-sectional daily returns
of the 50 stocks constituting Nifty. Abnormal returns is taken as the resid-
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ual of the Sharpe-Linter market model of modelling cross-sectional returns
as a function of the market return (daily returns of the index. Here, CNX
Nifty). He shows that cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR)1 does
not normalize after the event, indicating that market is slow in incorporating
the content of the monetary policy announcements. This, he argues, is evi-
dence for weak form ineﬃciency. Though a very interesting study, one can
point out some caveats. The impact of monetary policy on diﬀerent sectors
will be diﬀerent. So, it would have added to the analysis if one could group
the ﬁrms based on some criteria for such a disaggregated analysis. But, to
see the impact of the policy on the market, examining the index is better
since it evens out diﬀerent ﬁrm level information reaching the market and
reﬂects only those which aﬀects all the ﬁrms together. With regard to the
event window, such a large window assumes that policy announcement is the
only additional information that has happened during the event. The study
deﬁnes ‘good news’ as a policy announcement which was in contradiction
to the market-wide expectations. That is, though the market expects the
policy to be contractionary to curb inﬂation, it was actually left unchanged.
Therefore, the study is actually looking at the unexpected component with
respect to good news. The result that the market reacts positively before
the announcement, therefore, would imply that markets are eﬃcient in the
sense that the information was anticipated correctly.
3 Data and Methodology
We examine the trading days for the period from 1996 January to 2008
April, when there has been a change in the monetary policy stance. We
primarily focus at the three major tools in the hands of RBI namely, Cash
Reserve Ratio, Bank Rate, and Reverse repo rate; through which it aﬀects
the liquidity in the system (through CRR) and signals the interest rate in
the economy (through Bank Rate) and adjusts short term liquidity (reverse
repo rate). The policy announcement dates were compiled from the Annual
Reports of Reserve Bank of India from 1996-97 to 2007-2008. All together
we analyse 57 policy announcements occurring during this period.
We classify the policy date as expansionary or contractionary. The clas-
siﬁcation is made as follows: If
푦푖0 − 푦푖−1 > 0;퐶표푛푡푟푎푐푡푖표푛푎푟푦
1Abnormal returns is taken as the residual of the Sharpe-Linter market model of mod-
elling cross-sectional returns as a function of the market return, averaged over the period
of the event - 31 days.
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Figure 1: Mean Daily Returns Across Events
푦푖0 − 푦푖−1 < 0;퐸푥푝푎푛푠푖표푛푎푟푦
Where, 푦푖0 is the current policy stance and 푦
푖
−1 is the policy stance in the
previous period. 푦 is the policy variable and the superscript 푖 diﬀerentiates
policy instrument.
If the date of policy announcement is 푡, we examine the market behavior
for the just preceding and succeeding the policy announcement. That is, our
event window is 푡− 1 to 푡+ 1, where 푡 is the date of policy announcement.
We examine the impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock
market during the event window to examine semi-strong eﬃciency of the
Indian stock market. We ﬁrst examine the impact of policy announcements
during the event window using exploratory data analysis, and the results are
later tested using nonparametric tests.
4 Exploratory Data Analysis
An expansionary policy announcement is good news for the market as it re-
duces the cost of funds and/or increases the liquidity available for investment
as well as trading. As mentioned before, the event window is three days –
constituting the day before announcement (푡−1), the day of announcement(푡)
and the day after announcement (푡+ 1), respectively.
From ﬁgure 1 we can see that within the event window, market gives
a negative return during a contractionary policy announcement and a high
positive return, compared to a normal trading day, during an expansionary
policy announcement.
The day preceding an expansionary policy announcement gives the high-
est positive returns (0.39%). On the day of an expansionary policy announce-
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Table 1: Mean Daily Returns During the Event of Monetary Policy
Day Contractionary Expansionary
푡− 1 -0.29 0.39
푡 -0.12 -0.05
푡+ 1 0.18 0.07
Non-event days 0.05 0.05
Figure 2: Mean Returns During
Expansionary Policy
Figure 3: Mean Returns During
Contractionary Policy
ment we ﬁnd negative returns of -0.05%, which reverts to a positive 0.07% the
next day. Probably this is an indication of overreaction during the run-up to-
wards policy, which is corrected for in the coming days. High negative returns
are witnessed during the day before a contractionary policy announcement
(-0.29%). Compared to this the mean return on the day of a contractionary
policy announcement is smaller (-0.12%). Like in expansionary policy, we
again witness a reversal of sign after the day of announcement (0.18%). A
graphical representation of the two events are given in ﬁgures 2 and 3.
The high (low) returns prior to an expansionary (contractionary) policy
announcement would imply that markets anticipate the policy stance. Then
rational traders might be taking a trading strategy in which they go long
(short) in anticipation of an expansionary (contractionary) policy announce-
ment. And sell (buy) the day after an expansionary (contractionary) policy
announcement is made. As long as any trading rule can fetch excess returns,
the market is ineﬃcient according the Eﬃcient Markets Hypothesis.
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Figure 4: Mean Returns During Contractionary Policy: The Period Since
Weak-form Eﬃciency(since June 2003)
4.1 Impact Across Structural Breaks
Weak form eﬃciency is a precondition for testing semi-strong eﬃciency.
Sasidharan (2009) using Bai-Perron method for identifying endogenous mul-
tiple structural changes showed that for the period 1991 to 2008 there are 4
major structural breaks in the Nifty series. The period for structural breaks
are December 1994, July 1999, June 2003, January 2006. This implies there
are 5 regimes of structural changes, because for 푚 breaks there are 푚 + 1
regimes. Examining weak-form eﬃciency for these periods, it was shown
that the market became weak-form eﬃcient only since the third structural
break beginning in June 2003. Therefore, we test for semi-strong eﬃciency
for monetary policy announcements only for the weak-form eﬃcient period.
We have a total of 21 events during this period , of which 20 pertains to con-
tractionary policy event and only 1 corresponding to an expansionary policy
event. Therefore, we examine only the impact of contractionary policy be-
ginning from the fourth regime.
Aggregating the two regimes, we see that during a contractionary policy
event, there are large negative mean daily returns before the announcement;
near zero returns on the day of announcement and excessive positive returns
the day after. That is, we see a reversal in sign (see ﬁgure 4). For a much
disaggregated analysis, we separate the two regimes and examine the event.
Graphical summary of this is provided in ﬁgure 5. Though we do see a
reversal in sign, the pattern is quite diﬀerent. In regime4, we see high negative
returns on the day before announcement and high positive returns on the day
of announcement. But, immediately the day after, the mean returns revert
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Figure 5: Mean Returns During Contractionary Policy in Regimes 4 and 5
in sign to negative. Whereas in the case of regime4, negative returns are
observed on 푡−1 and 푡. But, turns positive the day after the announcement.
Is the reversal in sign just a random occurrence, or is it consistent across
all the observations? Looking at table 2 we can see that only 2 out of 5 obser-
vations had a reversal in sign from positive to negative between 푡 and 푡+ 1in
the fourth regime. In the case of the ﬁfth regime, only 6 out 14 observations
had a reversal in sign from negative to positive. Which implies that there is a
high possibility that our estimator of mean could be highly inﬂuenced by ex-
treme values or size of the observation, than by systematic patterns. We use
nonparametric methods to test this. We resort to nonparametric methods for
two major reasons. First, low sample size. Second the distribution of returns
is suspected to follow a stable paretian distribution (Sasidharan, 2009). The
property of inﬁnite population variance for this class of distribution makes
variance based estimators unrelaible (Fama, 1965)).
5 Nonparametric Analysis
Owing to the small sample size problem and non-normality of the distribu-
tion, we use nonparametric techniques to test the plausible hypothesis that
has emerged from exploratory data analysis. These hypothesis are:
1. Returns during an expansionary policy event is greater than a contrac-
tionary policy
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Table 2: Returns During Contractionary Policy: Regimes 4 and 5
t-Date 푡− 1 푡 푡+ 1 t-Date 푡− 1 푡 푡+ 1
11-09-04 1.19 0.39 31-01-07 -0.56 -1.02 1.33
26-10-04 -1.27 1.35 0.16 13-02-07 -3.13 -0.34 0.06
28-04-05 -1.11 0.30 -2.02 31-07-07 -0.12 1.98 -4.12
25-10-05 -2.02 0.97 -0.40 30-10-07 3.51 -0.63 0.54
24-01-06 -0.58 0.83 1.11 17-04-08 0.16 1.44 1.57
08-06-06 -2.65 -4.87 5.08 29-04-08 -0.43 2.06 -0.57
25-07-06 1.38 1.81 2.26 11-06-08 -1.14 1.64 0.35
31-10-06 0.79 -0.67 0.61 24-06-08 -1.88 -1.78 1.46
06-12-06 0.37 0.005 -0.01 29-07-08 0.47 -3.34 2.91
30-07-08 -3.34 2.91 0.45
2. During an expansionary policy event, returns are highest on day 푡− 1
compared to 푡+ 1
3. During a contractionary policy event, returns are lowest on day 푡 − 1
compared to 푡+ 1
4. There is a reversal in sign after the day of announcement during a
contractionary policy event
Nonparametric tests are primarily designed to check for consistency in
the patterns of observation, when it is diﬃcult to make a scientiﬁc judgment
regarding it. They are more concerned about the direction of the observation
than its size. Here we use Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test amd
Wilcoxon signed rank test. We ﬁrst explain the procedure of Wilcoxon signed
rank test. The approach for testing it is as follows: We take 퐷푖 as
퐷푖 = 푟푡−1 − 푟푡+1 (1)
and take as our model
퐷푖 = 휃 + 푒푡 (2)
where 푒푡 is the unobservable random variable and our parameter of inter-
est 휃 is the unknown ‘information eﬀect’ on the returns, due to the new
information. We test the null hypothesis:
퐻0 : 휃 = 0
To test, we take the absolute diﬀerences ∣퐷1∣, ∣퐷2∣, ..., ∣퐷푛∣, where 푛 is the
number of policy announcement. Then rank this from least to greatest.
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Deﬁne 휓 as
퐷푖 > 0⇒ 휓푖 = 1 (3)
퐷푖 < 0⇒ 휓푖 = 0 (4)
Our test statistic is deﬁned as:
푇+ =
푛∑
푖=1
푅푖휓푖 (5)
where 푅푖 denotes the rank of ∣퐷푖∣.
푇+ is known as the positive signed rank of 퐷푖.
퐷푖 > 0⇒ 푇+ = 푅푖 (6)
퐷푖 < 0⇒ 푇+ = 0 (7)
Therefore, 푇+ is the sum of positive signed ranks (Hollander and Wolfe,
1973).
For testing the 퐻0 against the alternative 휃 > 0, at signiﬁcance level 훼;
Reject 퐻0 if
푇+ ≥ 푡(훼, 푛)
Therefore, the null hypothesis we test is that there are no diﬀerences in
returns and any we see is just random, since diﬀerence 퐷푖 is equal to
퐷푖 = 휃 + 푒푡
We can also test the null hypothesis that two population locations are
the same using Wilcoxon rank sum test.
Suppose our sample 1 consists of returns during 푡−1 and sample 2 consists
of returns during 푡 + 1. We merge the two samples together and then rank
it. Let us denote the sum of ranks for sample 1 as 푅1, which we can take as
our test statistic 푅. A small value of 푅 indicates that most of the smaller
observations are in sample 1, and larger observations in sample 2. But we
need to prove that 푅 is small. If our null is true then it implies that each
possible ranking is equally likely. For example, assume that there are 3
observations in each of the two samples. So we have altogether 6 observations
which can be arranged in 6퐶3 ways, i.e., 20 diﬀerent ways. From this a
sampling distribution of 푅 can be drawn. We can compute the probability
of each rank appearing in the sampling distribution to be as 퐹푟푒푞/푛퐶푟. For
sample sizes greater than 10, sampling distribution of 푅 can be approximated
to a normal distribution (Keller, 2001). The test statistic is given by:
푍 =
푅− 퐸(푅)
휎푅
(8)
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Table 3: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test: Equality of Returns Across Contrac-
tionary and Expansionary Policy
Policy Obs Rank sum Expected
Contrac. 70 5128 5390
Expan. 83 6653 6391
Total 153 11781 11781
Var. 74561.67
Z -0.959
푃푟표푏 > ∣푧∣ 0.3373
Where,
퐸(푅) =
푛1(푛1 + 푛2 + 1)
2
(9)
휎푅 =
√
푛1푛2(푛1 + 푛2 + 1)12 (10)
5.1 Results
We ﬁrst test the hypothesis of equality of returns during expansionary and
contractionary policy events using Wilcoxon rank sum test. From the test-
statistics reported in table3 we can see the test statistic is not signiﬁcant at
5% level, and therefore the null hypothesis of equality of returns during the
two event windows cannot be rejected.
Next we test whether during an expansionary policy event, returns are
highest on day 푡 − 1 compared to 푡 + 1. The signed rank test we perform
failed to reject that a diﬀerence exists, as can be seen from table4. The same
test was performed to test for the hypothesis that during a contractionary
policy event, return are lowest on day 푡 − 1 compared to 푡 + 1. Like in the
previous two tests we could not ﬁnd statistical evidence in support for this
hypothesis as well (table5).
The fourth hypothesis we test is that reversal of sign during a contrac-
tionary policy event. To test this hypothesis we use a modiﬁed version of
Fisher’s sign test. For this, we deﬁne 휓푖 as 1 if we see a reversal in sign
after the day of announcement during regime4. That is, 휓푖 = 1 if 푟푡 > 0 but
푟푡+1 < 0.
We deﬁne B as
퐵 =
푛∑
푖=1
휓푖 (11)
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Table 4: Signed rank test: Equality of Returns Across Contractionary and
Expansionary Policy
Sign obs Rank sum Expected
Positive 15 246 248
Negative 16 250 248
All 31 496 496
Variance 2604
Z -0.039
푃푟표푏 > 푧 0.9687
Table 5: Signed rank test: Equality of Returns Across Contractionary and
Expansionary Policy
Sign Obs Rank sum Expected
Positive 11 122 162.5
Negative 14 203 162.5
All 25 325 325
variance 1381
Z -1.090
푃푟표푏 > 푧 0.275
The test statistic B* is deﬁned as:
퐵∗ = 퐵 − (푛/2)
(푛/4)1/2
(12)
Reject null hypothesis of no reversal in sign if 퐵∗ ≥ 푍훼/2
The computed 퐵∗ = −0.8. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis
that there is no reversal in sign.
Similarly, the test was repeated for regime 5. But, we redeﬁned 휓푖 as
휓푖 = 1 if 푟푡 < 0 but 푟푡+1 > 0.
For regime 5, 퐵∗ = −0.5714. Therefore, we do not reject the null hy-
pothesis of no reversal in sign.
Recap : Based on our exploratory data analysis we arrived at four plau-
sible hypothesis concerning the relationship between the event of monetary
policy announcement and stock market’s behaviour to it. The results from
nonparametric tests reveal that there is no systematic diﬀerence in the stock
market behaviour across the day of events or policy. The results also im-
ply that the reaction of the stock market to monetary policy announcement
cannot be generalisable as having any systematic patterns.
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6 Conclusion
Financial markets are at the core of monetary transmission mechanism.
Therefore, we expect monetary policy announcements to have signiﬁcant
impact on the stock market. The focus here has been to see how the mar-
kets react to a widely known event, having an economy wide impact. In
an eﬃcient market, the prices react instantly to a new information. A mar-
ket riding on stale information is informationally ineﬃcient. In the case of
monetary policy announcement, markets anticipate an announcement to be
forthcoming and, ideally it should be reacting to the unexpected component
in the announcement. Any overreaction or under-reaction will be corrected
following the information about the unexpected component.
With only exploratory data analysis it would have made us conclude that
the pattern exhibited by returns is indicative that the markets anticipate the
policy stance in advance and is reacting accordingly, since we see negative
(positive) excess returns before an contractionary (expansionary) policy an-
nouncement. One might have had the evidence of returns reverting in sign
the day after an announcement, indicating that markets overreact on and
prior to announcement which is adjusted for in the coming days, implying
that the market do not continue to ride in the direction of stale information.
Such a pattern could be in the direction of semi–strong eﬃciency. Traders
who anticipate the direction of, say, contractionary policy announcement will
short–sell before the announcement expecting the market to react downwards
following a contractionary policy announcement. If the markets moves down
further after the announcement then buying back the shares after the event
would have been a proﬁtable trading strategy . Instead, the buying pressure
on the market after the event gives a ﬁllip to the prices (which we see as pos-
itive returns). A trader reaching late in the market to trade in the direction
of the policy would probably ﬁnd a market moving against his expectation.
This can be in line with the semi-strong eﬃciency of the Eﬃcient Markets
Hypothesis.
But, with a non-normal data parametric inferences can be highly mislead-
ing. Therefore, our exploratory data analysis was tested using nonparamet-
ric tests. Nonparametric tests have the advantage that they are distribution
free and can be applied to small samples. The nonparametric tests we used
– Wilcoxon rank sum test, Wilcoxon signed rank test and Fishers sign test
have the added advantage that they are primarily testing for consistency in
behaviour. Unlike the arithmetic average, they are not inﬂuenced by the size
of single observation. Rather they are more concerned with the direction.
The nonparametric tests rejected any consistent behaviour across the pe-
riods of policy and type of policy. That is, it rejected any systematic dif-
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ference in the return behaviour between expansionary and contractionary
policy, as well as the days corresponding to the policy announcement event.
The contradictory results with exploratory data analysis could be due to dis-
tributional properties of returns. Being a Paretian distribution, it is possible
that we observe large changes during short periods of time. Therefore, there
will be a few large values of returns which can severely inﬂuence the direc-
tion of the parameters. Together, the results would imply that there is no
consistent, systematic eﬀect of monetary policy announcements immediately
on the Indian stock market. This makes our conclusion on semi-strong eﬃ-
ciency diﬃcult for several reasons. First, it could be that market is too noisy
to separate out the impacts of speciﬁc events. But a highly noisy market is
ineﬃcient. Second, it could be that each policy event have diﬀering impacts
on expectations. That is, the impact on expectations of a contractionary
policy to prick an asset price bubble will be diﬀerent from one which is di-
rected at controlling rising inﬂation. If that is the case, one will not see any
consistent patterns through which monetary policy eﬀects stock market.
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